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CRITIQUES OF KOHLBERG'S MODEL OF MORAL 
DEVELOPMENT: A SUMMARY * 
por PAUL c. VITZ 
New York University 
This article presents a critical evaluation of the most influential 
research-based model of moral development in academic psychology 
and in schools of education. The model is that of Lawrence Kohlberg 
(197la, 1981, 1984) who proposed a developmental series of cognitive 
stages, or levels, in human moral development. More specifically, 
Kohlberg posited a series of six universal stages of moral development 
through which all people go, though most people stop at sorne level 
before reaching Stage 6. The rate of passage between stages varies 
from individual to individual, as it can be affected to sorne degree by 
external factors. Kohlberg's basic research strategy was to present hypo­
thetical moral dilemmas to children and young adults, and then to 
analyze the reasons they gave for believing that one course of action, 
rather than another, should be followed. He claimed to have observed 
six distinct patterns of moral reasoning. 
Kohlberg was interested in the person's dominant pattem of moral 
reasoning: he was concerned with the form and process of the thought 
used, not with the actual moral decision made. Two people might 
disagree about what is to be done but use the same kind of reasoning, 
or they might come to the same decision but for very different reasons. 
Like so many modern psychological thinkers, Kohlberg was primarily 
concerned with structure and changes in structure (process), not in 
particular content. 
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Kolhberg claimed that when a person is studied over a number of 
years, evidence shows that he goes through the proposed series of 
moral reasoning patterns. Each pattern representes a qualitatively dis­
tinct «stage» in the person's life. The sequence of stages is the same for 
all people, though as noted, most never get to the higher stages: that is 
Five and Six. According to Kohlberg, nobody ever skips a stage, and no 
one ever regresses to an earlier stage. He did, however, allow that 
people may show a mixture of two adjacent stages since a person can 
be in transition between two stages. [1] 
1. The Basic Concerns of Kohlberg's Model 
Behind Kohlberg's reasoning and years of experimentation lay two 
major concerns. First, Kohlberg knew that moral relativism especially 
individual relativism, was, in spite of its present-day popularity, 
bankrupt. If everyone could select bis own values, society would cease 
to function. Second, Kolhberg wished to avoid all «indoctrination,» or 
direct teaching of what is moral, as he believed that to push for parti­
cular moral positions or values would violate the spirit of democracy 
in a pluralistic society; in particular, it would violate the requirement 
that government schools be neutral. 
Kolhberg thought bis model answered these two basic concerns by 
demonstrating that natural reasoning-that is, the natural develop­
ment of the mind, led to one and only one fundamental understanding 
of the moral life. The ultimate natural solution was found in the con­
cept of justice, as expressed in the highest stage of cognitive develop­
ment, Stage 6. 
It should be clear, even from the above brief presentation, that 
Kohlberg's approach was a serious intellectual venture, and there is no 
doubt that he generated a great deal of research and important thin­
king about the psychology of moral reasoning. Such activity is a genui­
ne contribution. But the central issue is: what is the validity of 
Kohlberg's model? This question has produced much comment, con­
troversy and criticism within the academic community. Major publis­
hed criticisms will be summarized here; for a deeper understanding 
the reader should see the references, especially those cited frequently 
or given emphasis. 
1.1. The critique of the concept of the «completely good self» 
The nature of the «self» that controls and uses the person's cogniti­
ve apparatus is not analyzed by Kohlberg. Still, like Rousseau, like the 
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humanistic psychologists (e.g, Promm, Maslow, and Rogers), and like 
the Values Clarification theorists (e.g., Raths, Simon), Kohlberg ap­
pears to assume that the self is intrinsically entirely good. There is 
simply no recognition of a natural human tendency to aggression, self­
deception, exploitation of others, narcissism-in short to evil. 
The notion of an autonomous intrinsically good self is one that has 
been severely criticized as seriously unrealistic. Psychoanalytic theorists 
from Sigmund Preud (e.g., the death instinct) to Melanie Klein (primal 
envy and rage) to Jacques Lacan (the ego as wrapped in illusion) have 
persistently proposed that unconscious violence, envy and deceptive­
ness often líe behind conscious thought. They have decried as an «illu­
sion» the idea that the conscious ego (or selt) reliably, much less always, 
knows why it does what it <loes. In recent years, as psychologists have 
reflected on events such as the Holocaust, the rise of urban crime, the 
growth in ethnic and racial violence, and bitter conflict all around the 
world based on intractable hatreds, they have come to the conclusion 
that the human self can hardly be described as completely and simply 
«good.» (Por additional evidence supporting this interpretation, see 
Vitz, 1994, Maclntyre, 1981, and Wallach and Wallach, 1983). 
Many scientists, e.g., the ethologists K. Lorenz, N. Tinbergen, have 
long observed that humans have a strong natural tendency to aggres­
sion which under various circumstances becomes quite dysfunctional 
(unjust); our sexuality is well known to warp human judgment. Por an 
excellent discussion of these issue by a psychologist, see Campbell 
(1974). 
Other evidence comes from many experiments in social psychology 
which document a common propensity for people to interpret their 
behavior in a favorable light, often to the detriment of others. This 
bias, called the «self-serving bias,» expresses itself in the reliable ten­
dency for success to be attributed to one's own efforts while failure is 
seen as due to external circumstances or others' incompetence. Por 
discussions of this widespread «narcissistic» bias in which we see our­
selves as better and more deserving than others, see Bradley (1978), 
Zuckerman (1979), Myers (1981); Miller and Porter (1988). 
Indeed, the implicit position that there is no natural human ten­
dency to «evil,» in and of itself, makes Kohlberg's model suspect as a 
model of moral development. Even at the lowest stages where such 
«selfishness» can be observed, it is the result of a developmental and 
cognitive failure, not the natural and common pursuit of self-interest. 
Certainly, the application of any abstract principle to a concrete 
situation often involves complex and problematic reasoning. Such rea-
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soning, when applied to a particular situation allows many opportuni­
ties for distortion in line with one's self-interest-often unconscious 
self-interest. 
Rest (1980), a colleague of Kohlberg's, claimed that the highest 
stages of moral understanding could not be misused or distorted by 
self-interest, no matter how sophisticated the attempt: that is, it would 
be impossible to construct a Stage 5 or Stage 6 moral argument for 
such things as genocide. According to Rest, once a certain cognitive 
understanding of justice has been reached, the concept cannot be se­
riously contaminated by such ugly things as sadistic motives, self­
interest, needs for power, or vengeance. He offered no evidence for 
this claim, however, and it is not hard to question it. After all, any 
principie of justice must also contain a rationale for who is to receive 
justice. For example, consider the issues of slavery, abortion, and cruelty 
to animals. All these moral problems revolve around the issue of who 
is a person, and what kinds of life are entitled to receive justice. In the 
past, slaves were not considered fully human, and were considered the 
property of their owners. Likewise, many today do not consider an 
unborn baby to be fully human; thus, it can be disposed of like physi­
cal property. Finally, many conservationists argue that certain animal 
species must be protected, even at great cost to humans. In short, the 
issue of justice throughout history has been intimately connected to 
the question: who (and what) is even entitled to «justice»? 
1.2. The feminist critique 
Kohlberg's theory has been cliticized as androcentlic in that it 
expresses a characte1istically masculine view of morality. Carol Gilli­
gan, a colleague of Kohlberg at Harvard, has made this point effective­
ly (1977, 1982, 1987). Gilligan pointed out the initial 1958 study, which 
remained the core of empirical support, was run exclusively on young 
American male subjects, from which Kohlberg then generalized to all 
human beings in all eras. Gilligan also claimed that Kohlberg's pre­
occupation with «male» values-such as rationalism, individualism, 
and liberalism-is responsible for the fact that adult females were 
sometimes found at lower stages than males. Males tended to be closer 
to Stage 4; females to Stage 3. (Stage 3 is «good boy-nice girl»; Stage 4 
is «system-maintaining morality,» e.g., law and order.) 
Kohlberg, Levine and Hewer (1984a,b) responded by noting that 
any difference between males and females on the moral development 
scale was generally small and not of any real substance. Furthermore, 
when the difference was substantial, they claimed that this is due to 
the fact that the males in question had more education than the lower-
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scoring females. According to Kohlberg, men and women will have 
equal moral development seores if education, status of job and other 
environmental factors are held constant. (As we will see, however, 
Kohlberg's response to this criticism is unsatisfactory.) 
Gilligan succinctly summarized the different approach to moral 
problems often taken by female subjects. Let us consider Kohlberg's 
best-known dilemma, that of Heinz. Heinz must steal a drug from a 
village druggist since it costs much more than he can pay, or else he 
must let his wife die. Gilligan wrote: 
Here in the light of its probable outcome-his wife dead, or Heinz in 
jail, brutalized by the violence of the experience and his life 
compromised by a record of felony-the dilemma itself changes. lts 
resolution has less to do with the relative weights of life and property 
in an abstract moral conception than with the collision it has produced 
between two lives, formerly conjoined but now in opposition, where 
the continuation of one life can now occur only at the expense of the 
other. Given this construction, it becomes clear why consideration 
(for women) revolves around the issue of sacrifice and why guilt 
becomes the inevitable concommitant of either resolution (1977, 
p. 512). 
She continued: 
The proclivity of women to reconstruct hypothetical dilemmas in 
terms of the real, to request or supply the information missing about 
the nature of the people and the places where they live, shifts their 
judgment away from the hierarchical ordering of principles and the 
formal procedures of decision-making that are critical for scoring at 
Kohlberg's highest stages ... the women's judgments pointed toward 
an identification of the violence inherent in the dilemma itself which 
was seen to compromise the justice of any of its possible resolutions. 
This construction of the dilemma led the women to recast the moral 
judgment from a consideration of the good to a choice between evils. 
(ibid.) 
Gilligan quite correctly proposed that in giving exclusive moral 
weight to justice, Kohlberg overlooked the moral worth of other princi­
pies, especially an ethic of caring: of merey. (For a more recent state­
ment, see Gilligan and Attanucci, 1988.) 
Hogan and Emler (1978), two other critics of Kohlberg, also critici­
zed this bias of his, by alluding to Shakespeare: 
This, the female virtue of merey, becomes a Stage 3 conception. but, 
as Portia reminds Shylock, merey qualifies justice ... «though justice 
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be thy plea, consider this, that in the course of justice, none of us 
should see salvation. We do pray for merey.» (p. 529). 
In spite of Gilligan's effective and well-known critique, Kohlberg 
showed no inclination to modify his model. To introduce a major new 
principle-such as caring or merey, involving empathy and interperso­
nal sensitivity-would have compromised the coherence of his abstract 
cognitive representation of moral development. (For a discussion of 
the hermeneutical conflict between the models of Kohlberg and 
Gilligan, see Brown and Tappan, 1991.) 
1. 3. The moral relativity critique. 
A central philosophical difficulty in Kohlberg's model is bis as­
sumption that moral development can be characterized as a develop­
ment in morally-neutral rational competence, without regard to actual 
moral decisions: moral content. As noted earlier, Kohlberg emphatica­
lly rejected moral relativism and believed that bis approach avoided 
the errors of relativism: 
The cognitive-developmental or progressive view [Kohlberg's view] 
claims that, at heart, morality represents a set of rational principies 
of judgment and decision valid for every culture . .. Our research in to 
the stages in the development of moral reasoning, then, provides the 
key to a new approach to moral education as the stimulation of 
children's moral judgment to the next stage of moral development 
(emphasis Kohlberg, 1978, p. 14). 
Now when psychologists such as Piaget talk about stages of inte­
llectual development, they not only speak of the development of grea­
ter cognitive flexibility and differentiation, but they also show that the 
higher level leads to correct or more nearly c01Tect answers. They 
show how the child has a better understanding of an agreed-upon 
externa!, objective truth, such as a truth of logic or a fact about percep­
tual reali ty. 
But with morality the idea of reality testing-of being right-is 
rejected by Kohlberg, since he claimed that there is no external or 
objective possibility of being right. This preoccupation with mental 
structure and its development, without an objective standard leads to 
the moral relativism that Kohlberg supposedly rejected. To demonstra­
te this we begin with the question: Why and how <loes a person move 
from a lower to a higher stage? A person at a lower stage discovers that 
moral questions become too complex and too confusing in terms of 
the concepts currently being used. The pressure for cognitive integra­
tion and equilibrium leads him to formulate a new set of principles in 
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order to handle moral issues more adequately. At each new and higher 
stage the person is cognitively integrated in a way that allows him to 
resolve the cognitive dissonance which facilitated the growth. This 
cognitive development is greatly aided, according to Kohlberg, by role­
taking. (Role-taking for Kohlberg means the tendency to react to others 
as like the self, and to react to the self's behavior from the other's point 
of view.) Kohlberg posited that the impulse to take the role of others is 
natural, and that this leads to a natural concern for fairness and justi­
ce. This role-taking in increasingly more varied and complex moral 
situations is therefore central to moral development. 
Kohlberg's general strategy required that his concept of cognitive 
adequacy be value-neutral. He <lid not claim that the role-taking ten­
dency and the pattern of reasoning it sets in motion are «good.» These 
are simply natural facts-i.e., universal developmental characteristics 
of the human mind, similar to other forms of natural growth and 
development. In spite of this claim of value-neutrality, Kohlberg was, 
however, frequently ambivalent on the matter. He said, for example: 
«At every stage, children perceive basic values like the value of human 
life, and are able to empathize and take the roles of other persons ... » 
This is not just a descriptive comment for it suggests that people at all 
stages recognize life as good, and indeed it suggests that life is, in fact, 
good. His tendency to slide, without noticing, back and forth from 
neutral descriptions of morality, to the implicit valuing of such things 
as life and role-taking abilities, to the value of development per se, and 
finally to the valuing of the justice principle, is a common confusion in 
Kohlberg's system. 
Ultimately, Kohlberg's system is profoundly relativistic. Let us look 
in sorne detail at certain statements by Kohlberg. Here I am endebted 
to the philosopher Nicholas Wolterstorff (1980), whose analysis I will 
often follow below. 
Kohlberg stated (197la, p. 43) that he <lid not believe that «moral 
judgments describe objective states of the world in ... the same way as 
scientific judgments describe objective states of the world.» Instead, 
moral judgments and norms are ultimately to be understood as univer­
sal mental constructs which regulate social interaction. (This shows 
the basic Kantian foundation of Kohlberg.) Thus, Kohlberg writes: «A 
higher conception of the value of love or a higher conception of moral 
emotion ... is not directly truer than a lower conception. » He goes on, 
in a most peculiar passage, to say: 
Our claim that Stage 6 is a more moral code of thought than lower 
stages is not the claim that we can or should grade individuals as 
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more or less moral. We argue elsewhere that there is no valid or final 
meaning to judging or grading persons as morally better or worse. 
Judgments on persons as morally good or bad or judgments of praise 
and blame are not justified by the existence of universal moral 
principles as such. At the highest stage, the principle of justice (or 
the principle of maximizing human welfare) prescribes an obligation 
to act justly (or to blame the unjust) or give us rules for meting out 
blame to the unjust. Although there are sorne rational grounds for 
punishment, there are no ultimately rational or moral grounds for 
blaming other people. From a moral point of view, the moral worth 
of all persons is ultimately the same; it is equal (Kohlberg, l97la, 
p. 48) 
What did Kohlberg say here? Wolsterstorff struggled nobly with 
this confused passage, first observing that Kohlberg's basic point is 
that it is never right or wrong, as such to do something. Instead, 
actions are right or wrong only relative to a certain principle. Relative 
to the justice principle, an action might be wrong. But relative to a 
utility principle, the same action might be right. And Kohlberg seems 
to be arguing that there is no way to determine whether any principle 
is more right or wrong than another. Apparently it is not possible to 
choose an incorrect principle. Wolsterstorff concluded: «All one can do 
is apply correctly or incorrectly whatever principle one has chosen. » 
(Wolterstorff, p. 88) 
If Wolterstorff's interpretation is correct, then Kohlberg holds that 
morality is relative to sorne principle but there is no way to choose 
among principles. Kohlberg considers there to be no absolute moral 
basis for making a moral judgment about principles of morality. Des­
pite bis frequent denials of the validity on moral relativism, he ends up 
at a relativism of moral principles. 
But Kohlberg did defend bis highest principle of justice on certain 
externa! grounds, namely it had the following three properties: it is 
universal in that it applies to all persons and actions. Second, it is 
prescriptive in that it states what should be done. Finally, the principle 
of justice is autonomous, for it makes no appeal to any other authority, 
or to what anyone else believes on moral matters. 
If Kohlberg meant that these criteria describe the nature of a prin­
ciple at the highest level of natural development, he has a problem. 
First, there are other possible principles besides justice that would fill 
the same requirements, such as those based on utility, or on mercy­
and above all on a principle of responsible love-but are simply igno­
red by Kohlberg. There are also times when he seems to imply that bis 
criteria for a principle are themselves int1insically good. In addition, 
Kohlberg spoke of bis concept of autonomy-that is, independence 
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from any authority (other than the self)-as a desirable quality. When 
he slips into this mode of expression, he has of course violated his pose 
of neutrality by taking an ideological stance. 
1.4. The ((no moral responsibility» critique 
One problem that results from the model's characterization of how 
cognition and the moral life develop is that there is no rationale within 
Kohlberg's system for holding a person responsible for his moral 
choices. One can hardly be responsible for inadequate moral develop­
ment. Many peo ple have never had an adequate environment ( or in 
sorne cases, adequate mental endowment) for the higher moral stages 
to develop. If superior moral life depends on complex cognitive develo­
pment, how can one be blamed, much less punished, for moral failure? 
Many adults are scored at Stages 1 ,  2 or 3: is this their fault? Is 
Kohlberg arguing that criminals are just inferior at moral cognition­
rather like being «bad at math»? 
This weakness is also one of the reasons why Kohlberg, after trying 
to apply his strictly «non-judgmental» cognitive approach, admitted 
that in the actual school setting, specific indoctrination is needed. That 
is, Kohlberg eventually acknowledged that direct teaching of right and 
wrong is necessary in the classroom. In this admission, Kohlberg (1978a) 
departed from his long-held earlier rejection of this approach. Power, 
Higgins and Kohlberg (1989) give a detailed treatment of this change. 
1. 5. The critique of Kohlberg's atheism 
Kohlberg classified any appeal to God as authoritative. lt is an 
appeal to rules which automatically puts a person clown to Stage 4, or 
possibly lower. This position comes from Kohlberg's placing the au­
thority of the autonomous individual, instead of the authority of God, 
at the center of his system. Thus his model is explicitly atheistic in its 
understanding of the moral life. Such atheism is an assumption made 
by Kohlberg on necessarily non-empirical and non-rational grounds. 
(For Kohlberg's rejection of divine authority, see 1981, pp.3 12-318.) The 
basic religious idea that «true autonomy»-that is, true freedom, inclu­
ding freedom from the self and its narcissism-comes from the love of 
God appears to be antithetical to Kohlberg's system. In any case, obe­
dience to God or obedience to the self are both obediences to a kind of 
authority. 
Here is Kohlberg's description of his scoring system which makes 
this anti-religious bias very clear. The respondent, a boy named 
Richard, was asked for his moral reaction to merey killing. He replied: 
rev. esp. ped. Lll, 197, 1994 
14 PAUL C. VITZ 
I don't know. In one way, it's murder; it's not a right or a privilege of 
man to decide who shall live and who should die. God put life into 
everybody on earth and you're taking away something from that 
person that carne directly from God, and you're destroying something 
that is very sacred; it's in a way part of God and it's almost destroying 
a pa1i of God when you kill a person. There's something of God in 
everyone. 
Kohlberg commented: 
Here Richard clearly displays a Stage 4 concept of life as sacred in 
terms of its place in a categorical moral or religious arder. The value 
of human life is universal, it is true for ali humans. It is still, however, 
dependent on something else, upon respect for God and God's 
authority; it is not an autonomous human value (Kohlberg, 1970,  pp. 
111-112). 
Kohlberg simply assumed that the principie of obedience to self, a 
value currently held by many Americans, is higher than one based on 
obedience to God. And after all, this belief in the presumed autono­
mous self is a cultural norm and really belongs perhaps at the Conven­
tional Level-Stages 3 and 4. Post-modem critiques of the modem self 
as a social construct that is now understood as false, empty or disinte­
grating are proposed by Baumeister (1987, 1991); Cushman (1990); 
Gergen (1991); Landy (1993). Certainly, Kohlberg's belief can be viewed 
as the result of the indoctrination of his own mid-20th c. American 
secular social environment. Furthermore, it is not at all clear how this 
last answer is a standard Stage 4 answer. That is, it is not obviously 
directed at «system-maintaining.» Apparently, a belief in the sacred­
ness of life and a concem for God's presence in everyone, to Kohlberg, 
is equivalent to a common stage 4 «right wing» defense of «law and 
order.» 
Kohlberg was fond of citing the Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr. as a 
presumed example of Stage 6, the highest moral stage. And yet Kohl­
berg completely failed to grasp how King's political and moral stature 
was an expression of his religious commitment. Here is a representati­
ve quotation from King, from the night before his assassination: «I just 
want to do God's will.» (King, 1969, p. 316). In short, though Kohlberg 
promoted him to Stage 6, King is presumably a classic stage 4 person 
in his statement about the fundamental source of his principies. 
1. 6. The empathy and emotion critique: The rejection of Stage 1 
Kohlberg assumed that the moral life is primarily determined by 
rational, logical, or cognitive factors. In other words, human rationali­
ty as expressible in verbal form is the essential ingredient of the moral 
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life. This common tendency for cognitive theorists to neglect emotio­
nal, innate, imagistic, and non-verbal aspects of human psychology 
has received growing criticism in recent years, e.g., Zajonc (1980), Sie­
gel (1978). (Vitz, 1988, has referred to this assumption as «left-hemis­
phere imperialism.») 
Kohlberg completely neglects the evidence for the powerful emo­
tional and non-verbal determinants of morality. Let us look at sorne of 
the evidence. Yarrow and Zahn-Waxler (1977) show that children only 
a year old have a capacity for compassion and for various pro-social 
behaviors. There is good evidence that a reliable capacity for empathy, 
as well as the ability to show feeling for others, begins at a very early 
age. This empathy leads to altruistic or «good samaritan» behavior, 
even by sorne one-year-old children. According to Piaget, and also 
Kohlberg, children this young are so cognitively undeveloped that they 
cannot «think» about doing good. They are at a stage of simple selfish­
ness. The now-considerable evidence for empathy and early emotion 
based helping actions leads psychologists like Hoffman (1978, 1983, 
l99la) to propase a very early empathic-or emotional-basis for al­
truism. In many respects, Gilligan's position about the interpersonal 
foundation of women's moral thought is reinforced by this recent work 
on empathy, especially Hoffman's. (See also Gilligan and Wiggins, 1987.) 
In general, Kohlberg's understanding of the moral life of young 
children seems seriously inadequate, rather like the projection of adult 
abstract thought backward onto children. Far more impressive contri­
butions to a psychological understanding of the emergence of morality 
in children are found in the work of Kagan (1981), of Hoffman (1983, 
1987) and of Turiel (1983). 
The evidence for empathy as central to early moral life represents 
a strong criticism of Kohlberg's Stage l. It is important to note that 
such moral responses in the very young are unlikely to be mediated by 
cognition-much less by articulated responses to «dilemmas.» That 
much important human behavior is determined by emotional respon- · 
ses occurring long befare any cognition is present, is argued persuasi­
vely by Zajonc (1980).  The convincing evidence for simple, 
compassionate moral life in very young children means that Kohlberg's 
Stage 1 is simply unconvincing. 
1. 7. The empirical critique: the inability to find various stages. 
Schweder, Mahapatra and Miller (1987) point out (p. 15) that only 
1 or 2 % of all responses are post-conventional (e.g., Stage 5 or 6) and 
that even pure pre-conventional responses (Stages 1 and 2) are infre­
quent. The vast majority of responses fall into the conventional cate-
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gory: Stages 3 and 4. One must conclude that most subjects in all 
cultures think of morality in terms of the group. This implies either 
that Kohlberg's system really only distinguishes between two catego­
ries, or that his interview method and scale fail to address important 
aspects of his respondents' moral life 
A major empirical critique has focused on Stage 6, the model's 
highest stage. The central issue is the lack of evidence for anyone 
reaching this level-at least for anyone who took Kohlberg's moral 
development test. Stage 6 is characterized by the universal ethical prin­
cipie of justice. Kohlberg eventually admitted (1984, pp. 270-274) that 
Stage 6 is a hypothetical stage with no real empirical support. Howe­
ver, he maintained Stage 6 at the theoretical level: he was committed 
to it as the truly highest stage, just one to which people rarely rise. As 
mentioned, Kohlberg personally judged Martin Luther King, Jr. to be 
at Stage 6, but he never looked at King's thought very, and of course 
King never took Kohlberg's test. 
The failure actually to find people at the sixth and highest stage 
has been a serious blow to the system, empirically speaking a point 
made by several critics, e.g., Reed ( 1987). Furthermore, the recent 
implication that stage regression may occur suggests additional pro­
blems. In this regard, see a trenchant criticism of Kohlberg's assumption 
that later mental structures are always superior to earlier ones in Fla­
nagan ( 199 1, pp. 19 1-95). 
1. 8. Over-dependency on language: Critique of all stages 
The basic notion of cognitive stages has come under severe criti­
cism, even Piaget's cognitive and perceptual stages, primarily because 
evidence for such stages has depended on children's verbal capacities 
(see Brown & Desforges, 1979; Siegel, 1978). For example, Schiff (1983) 
has shown that the child is capable of demonstrating conservation of 
length long before he reaches the 6 to 12-year-old stage, proposed by 
Piaget. Specifically, the child is capable of conservation by age 4 1/2 if 
the task <loes not require a verbal response. The typical failure of 
psychologists to find conservation at the earlier age was due to the 
child's lack of linguistic sophistication; it was not because the child 
could not grasp the concept. (For another critique of Piaget's stages, 
see Gelman and Baillargeon, 1983). 
Schweder (1982a) makes this point in his claim that Kohlberg has a 
naive understanding of the meaning of children's language. For exam­
ple, Kohlberg asked a 10-year old child «Why shouldn't someone steal 
from a store, anyhow?» When the child replied, «It is not good because 
there might be someone who could see you and call the police,» it was 
classified as a Stage 1 response. Schweder made the following wager 
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with Kohlberg: «I will bet that 7-to-10 year-old children do not define 
rightness or wrongness by punishment. 1 will bet that Kohlberg's 10-
year-old <loes not mean that because you might get punished it is 
wrong to steal, but instead means to state that someone will call the 
police because it is wrong to steal...In my experience when the issue is 
pressed further and children are asked questions like, 'what if there 
were no punishment?' or 'what if no one could call the police?' they 
maintain the act would still be wrong. In the mind of the child trans­
gressions are punished because they are wrong, not vice versa.» 
(p. 424) 
Schweder goes on to point out that we are now quite aware that 
Piaget, with respect to objective cognitive stages, seriously underesti­
mated the operational capacity of young children and the idea of Pia­
getian stages of cognitive development has taken a beating. (See 
Schweder, Mahaptra and Miller, 1987, p. 13; Schweder, l982b.) Also, 
much of this literature has shown that the content of the task is decisi­
ve in how a child thinks about it and that thinking is often very task­
specific. 
Likewise, there is every reason to think that Kohlberg's reliance on 
verbally-presented abstract dilemmas and on the subject's ability to 
give various complex verbal responses has distorted our ability to un­
derstand children's important early moral life. Indeed, the moral life of 
many adults is probably seriously underestimated, if one must depend 
on the sophistication of their verbal skills as the sole index to their 
morality. This point is supported by Kalam (1981) who also pointed to 
statements scored at different stages that are identical except for the 
wording. For example: 
The judge should punish Heinz... beca use a judge has to punish 
people ... (Stage 1) 
Because it's expected of judges to give sentences when people deserve 
them (Stage 3)  
Because a judge is  obligated to judge from the legal point of view 
(Stage 4). 
These statements, as Kalam (p. 2 19) noted, differ in verbal sophis­
tication, but they mean much the same thing. 
1. 9. The methodological critique of the Kohlberg scale 
Important criticisms of Kohlberg's model have focused on his scale 
for measuring a person's stage of moral development. This 
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scale-Moral Maturity Scale-was never standardized. That is, after 
more than 25 years of research, the actual dilemmas and the procedu­
res for scoring were not fixed even at the time of Kohlberg's death. 
(For the last discussion of the scale by Kohlberg, see Kohlberg 1984, 
Part III.) The scale was under constant revision and these changes 
make earlier experiments using earlier scales hard to interpret. And of 
course the scale's reliability and validity cannot be measured until the 
measurement procedures have been standardized. As a result of this 
problem (and of others discussed here) many knowledgeable resear­
chers who are not Kohlbergians simply do not think that Kohlberg's 
stages exist. Different patterns of reasoning about morality exist, but 
large numbers of psychologists do not accept these as natural stages of 
moral growth. 
Another methodological difficulty has been Kohlberg's almost ex­
clusive focus on abstract rather fantastic dilemmas, such as that of 
Heinz. Few people, if any, ever face such dilemmas, which are far 
removed from the concrete moral conflicts that are typical of the ac­
tual lives of human beings. This abstract unreal quality has led 
Kohlberg's critics, and even Kohlberg himself, to describe them as 
«Science fiction» dilemmas. 
1.1 O. Structure vs. content: the empirical critique 
A major methodological critique was developed by Kalam (1981) in 
a study conducted in India that tested Christians, Hindus and Muslims 
on Kohlberg's scale. Kalam's little-known critical study is important 
since it was done in collaboration with Kohlberg and with Kohlberg's 
associate Anne Colby, and because the criticism focused on an impor­
tant assumption of Kohlberg's model-in fact, on a major assumption 
of most cognitive psychology. Kohlberg assumes that the structure of 
thought and reasoning can be measured in a way that is independent 
of the content of the person's thought. 
For Kohlberg, as already noted, this means that each stage of mo­
ral development is a way of thinking-a way of processing information 
or a kind of logic-that is independent of what the person is thinking. 
Kohlberg's method of identifying each stage, therefore, must be inde­
pendent of the moral issue being thought about. Kalam in his doctoral 
thesis provides extensive evidence that Kohlberg's scale repeatedly con­
fuses the content of the subject's moral thought with its structure. 
Kalam's work thus shows that Kohlberg's fundamental interna! logic is 
seriously compromised. Let us look at sorne of Kalam's evidence on 
the content-structure issue. 
Certain «elements» (formerly called «motives» or «concerns») and 
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which always have a 'particular content are associated only with cer­
tain stages. In theory, each «element» or «concem» should occur at 
each stage but be treated by a different structural principle. For exam­
ple, the «concern» with «maintaining equity» <loes not occur until 
Stage 4, «Social contract or freely agreed to» doesn't occur until Stage 
4. «Avoiding punishment» <loes not occur in the scoring manual after 
Stage 3. Good and bad reputation doesn't occur after Stage 4. And 
«justice» doesn't occur as a concem at Stages 1, 2, or 3. In short, an 
easy way to leam Kohlberg's coding system is to treat each of his six 
stages as a content or concern. His rationale for content-free principles 
ofmoral thinking is simply unconvincing when the scoring manual is 
looked at closely. 
In addition, as Kalam (1981) also showed (pp. 169-71), Kohlberg 
assumed that anyone who has heard about his six stages can, with 
sorne months of practice, leam to use his scoring manual (e.g., Colby 
et al, 1980). This ability to score all 6 stages is seen as the result of the 
scorers' being «capable of seeing things from the subject's viewpoint.» 
People at Stages 3 and 4, for example, can leam to score responses at 
higher stages. Elsewhere, however, Kohlberg explicitly claimed that 
higher stages are the result of a stage of cognitive organization that 
cannot be reached by ordinary learning (Kohlberg, 1969, p. 348). But 
how can a scorer learn to score-to recognize-all levels of Kohlberg's 
system unless he or she is also at Stage 6? A distinguishing mark of the 
cognitive developmental approach is that it is «difficult for individuals 
to understand and recapitulate reasoning of higher stages, and espe­
cially reasoning more than one stage above their own stage ... » (see 
Rest, Turiel & Kohlberg, 1969). The fact that people can leam to use 
the Kohlberg scoring system, whatever their own stage level, strongly 
suggests that the scoring system is responding to content differences­
that is, to differences in issues and vocabulary and not to differences 
in moral principies. Either that, or in fact it is relatively easy to move 
all the way up to Stage 6 thinking. 
Kohlberg admitted that his scoring system of the l960's and early 
70's mistook «Concems» for structure. (See Kohlberg, 1976, p. 43; Kohl­
berg, el al., 1978, p. 34) The problem is that even his last revised system 
(1984) is quite similar to his earlier ones. In addition, much of the 
Kohlberg research using the earlier system has continued to be cited in 
support of the model. 
Kalam concluded by saying: 
My criticism is not just of the validity and reliability of the instrument 
[the scoring system], but of the very theoretical foundations on which 
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it is built. . .  [namely, that Kohlberg has separated content and 
structure] . . .  As long as these basic claims remain unestablished, all 
the reports about psychometric reliability, consistency, validity, etc. 
amount to nothing . . .  Kohlberg and his associates ha ve devised an 
ingenious system to squeeze people's moral judgments into five or 
six arbitrary pigeon-holes (pp. 222-223) 
1.11. Structure vs. content: the theoretical critique 
As noted, Kohlberg assumed that the natural direction of moral 
development is toward increasingly intemalized cognitive moral con­
trols at the end of which the individual is socially and morally autono­
mous. Each individual will thus ultimately discover for himself a natural 
cognitive morality that owes nothing important to cultural or histori­
cal heritage. Curiously, however, Kohlberg argued that the social envi­
ronment is a major stimulus that drives moral cognitive development. 
Somehow this environment is not supposed to affect the content of a 
person's morality, o nly its structure. 
Schweder (1982) noted that there is a trade-off between rationality 
and relevance, and that if moral concepts are to be made fully rational, 
they must be emptied of content and made devoid of relevance to 
every-day decisions. In contrast, if moral concepts are to be made 
relevant to actual moral problems, then they must be enriched with 
non-rational assumptions, i.e., content. For example, the formal prin­
ciple of justice reduces to the abstraction «treat like cases alike and 
different cases differently.» But this principle <loes not state which 
likenesses and differences count. Thus, the formal principle of justice 
says nothing about how particular people are to be treated. We all 
acknowledge, for example, the many conditions in which children will 
be treated differently from adults, but of course this raises the issue 
mentioned above about whether to include unborn children, animals, 
and so forth. 
1.12. The ideological critique 
Perhaps the most frequent criticism of the Kohlbergian model has 
been that it embodies ideological assumptions that are presented as 
part of a supposedly scientifically verified theory (see Simpson, 1974; 
Sullivan, 1977; Bennett & Delattre, 1978; Hogan & Emler, 1978; Samp­
son, 1981; Levin, 1982; Schweder, 1982a; Schweder, et al., 1987; Kilpa­
trick, 1992.) 
One sign of such an ideological and cultural bias is the fact that a 
moral judgment score depends a great <leal on education level. For 
example, in various studies in which males scored higher than females 
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in moral development, Kohlberg argued that this is due to the average 
greater education and job status of men. Such an observation imme­
diately raises serious issues of bias in Kohlberg's test. Typical human 
experience does not reliably suggest that better educated people-men 
in particular-are reliably more moral. This question becomes acute 
when one reads the comments by Rest (1980) about research in which 
it was found that moral judgment seores increase with education, as 
follows: 
Junior high school students 22 
Senior high school students 32 
College students 42 
Graduate students in business 52 
Students in liberal Protestant seminary 60 
Doctoral students of moral philosophy 
and political science 65 
No doubt Ph.D.'s doing research on moral education presumably 
top the scale! The curious thing is that after describing these results, 
Rest (1980) made the following qualification: «Remember that a moral 
judgment seo re ... should not be used as an indication of who is a 
better person, or who behaves more responsibily» (p. 544). This dis­
claimer implies that there is no true «value» associated with a high 
score on a moral development scale. But only four pages later, Rest 
contradicted himself. He says that moral judgment seores are not just 
a measure of cognitive or intellectual competence, but that they mea­
sure how morally a person behaves as well. Thus, he proposed that 
such seores predict behavior-and he means morally superior beha­
vior, such as being more cooperative, not cheating, etc. 
This issue is extremely important. At times, Kohlberg or his asso­
ciates have claimed that they are only measuring the level of cognitive 
competence with which a person reasons about morality: thus, is the 
person intellectually skilled with regard to moral issues? Here, no va­
lue judgment is being made about who is more moral. When Kohlber­
gians argue this way, the model is justly criticized by its detractors as 
trivial. One does not have to be a behaviorist to see that a model of 
moral thought unrelated to moral action is close to being meaningless 
and useless. Responding to this c1iticism, Kohlberg and Candee (1984), 
and others like Blasi (1980) and Rest (1980) began to claim, on the basis 
of sorne very modest evidence, that people with high moral develop­
ment seores actually do behave better: they are more moral people. 
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But the Kohlbergians cannot have it both ways. They cannot argue 
that people with high seores (e.g., doctoral students) are not morally 
better than others, and then someplace else say that they are. 
Let us return to the claims that the model is pervaded with ideolo­
gy. Keep in mind the assertion that high seores are associated with 
higher levels of education and with high social status-and that 
Kohlberg carne to the point of claiming that high seores predict, on 
average, more moral behavior. This would predict, for example, in this 
country and throughout much of the world, that since on average 
husbands have more education and higher status jobs, they should be 
more moral than their wives. Although the author is a husband he 
would not wish to assert such a claim. Neither has it been my expe­
rience that graduate students or college prof essors are generally more 
moral than school teachers or farmers or waitresses, nor has it been 
my experience that physicians are more moral than nurses, etc. It is 
true that sorne groups, such as lawyers on average, have higher inte­
llectual skills or more practice in verbal or abstract reasoning than, 
say, farmers. But this fact <loes not make the former more «moral» 
than the latter. The relationship between intellectual skills and the 
practice of morality is problematic at best. 
The most common ideological bias attributed to Kohlberg is that 
his system is an expression of Western liberal social and política! ideo­
logy (e.g., Sullivan, 1977 ; Bennett & Delattre, 1978; Hogan & Emler, 
1978; Schweder, l982a). Kohlberg did admit the intellectual origins of 
his system in Western liberal thought, for example, his debt to Rawls 
(1971), and through Rawls to Kant, but he denied that this origin affec­
ted the «objectivity» of his system (Kohlberg, Levine & Hewer (1984b). 
Thus, one looks in vain in the writings of Kohlberg for concern 
with issues such as sexual morality, abortion, freedom from govern­
ment controls, etc. Instead the agenda of moral topics covered in the 
Kohlberg literature was the standard liberal, socialist, and secular one 
of 1960 to 1985. 
Schweder's ideological critique has been especially strong. He has 
characterized Kohlberg as follows: 
Kohlberg believes that reason is on the side of those who oppose 
capital punishment, hierarchy, tribalism, and divine authority . .. .  He 
holds out for secular humanism, egalitarianism, and the Bill of Rights 
as rational ideals or objective endpoints for the evolution of moral 
ideas. [He also believes that] the history of the world and the history 
of childhood is the story of the progressive discovery of the principles 
of the American Revolution. (Schweder, l982a, p. 42 1) 
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Schweder sums this up as «liberalism has become destiny.» 
A dominant theme in Kohlberg's essays is that morality results 
from the development of reason. «What Kohlberg seeks is a conceptua­
lization of what is moral derived from premises that no rational person 
could possibly deny by means that no rational person could possibly 
avoid-preferably deductive logic.» (1982a, p. 422) 
Schweder pointed out, however, that Alasdair Maclntyre (198 1) has 
made it clear that there is no rational justification for moral positions 
that is possible within the framework of Western culture established at 
the time of the Enlightenment. (This point is even clearer in Macln­
tyre, 1988.) Maclntyre (1981, pp. 1 1, 70) concluded, for example, that 
«moral debate [e.g. over such matters as abortion], is rationally inter­
minable.» Or as Schweder commented, «Two hundred years of bri­
lliant reflection has yet to produce any consensus about the nature of 
that purported 'objective' morality.» (1982a, p. 422) Put differently, 
modern Enlightenment philosophy has been built out of premises whi­
ch are themselves non-rational, and which any rational person can 
reasonably deny. 
1.13. The sexual morality critique 
As noted above, Kohlberg failed to address abortion as a moral 
issue. Whatever one's position on abortion, this is certainly one of the 
central moral dilemmas of our day. If Kohlberg's model has nothing to 
say on this issue, his model looks irrelevant. If it <loes bear on this 
issue, one would like to see how. In view of Kohlberg's other standard 
stances on moral questions, the model is probably pro-abortion. But 
that remains to be seen. Gilligan (1982), arguing from a general Kohl­
bergian notion of post-conventional morality, makes it clear that a pro­
abortion decision is often an expression of the «highest» level of women's 
moral reasoning. (The decision to abort a child is interpreted by Gilli­
gan as an example of a woman's greater concern with caring!) 
Let us turn, however, to Kohlberg's response to more standard 
issues of sexual morality. Take the case of adultery, which involves 
betrayal, and almost always lying and deceit-all ultimately issues of 
justice. Furthermore, in view of the frequent painful and destructive 
effects of adultery on children (e.g., intense parental conflict, and often 
divorce) the issue of justice for children and society at large might well 
arise. But Kohlberg never turned his model to such concrete and every­
day issues of sexual morality. There are no discussions of sexual dilem­
mas in Kohlberg 1981 or 1984; Lockwood, 1978, also noted the absence 
of sexual dilemmas in Kohlberg's work (p. 46). The reasons for this 
neglect of sexual issues have been noted and commented upon by 
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Kalam, 1981, pp. 199-204) and are discussed below. Kohlberg (197lb, p. 
2 1) made what appears to have been his only published interpretation 
of a sexual moral dilemma in the following case: 
A hoy and a girl fall in love in high school and get married right after 
graduation. They never had sexual relations before marriage. After 
they are married the girl finds that she doesn't like having sexual 
intercourse, it just makes her feel bad and she decides not to have 
intercourse with her husband. Reluctantly her husband persuades 
her to go to a marriage counselor and she asks the marriage counselor, 
«Do I have an obligation to sleep with my husband, we want to stay 
married but do 1 have an obligation to sleep with him?» 
What advice should be given? Does the wife have an obligation or not? 
Then we go on. The wife says she wants to stay married and the 
husband says the same thing, but goes on to say, «I met another girl 
and 1 want to have sexual relations with her. 1 asked my wife if she 
minded since she wouldn't sleep with me, if 1 sleep with somebody 
else and she said, 'No, it wouldn't bother me. '  Is it alright for me to 
sleep with this other girl or would it be wrong to? (Kohlberg, 197lb, 
p. 2 1; quoted in Kalam, p. 202). 
Kohlberg's answer to this problem demolishes all his claims about 
his sixth stage morality (Kalam, p. 202). Kohlberg says: 
The real problem is that nothing has been specified in this situation. 
There really is nothing in the act of sex, per se, which is right or 
wrong. We haven't been given what we need to determine rightness or 
wrongness of a choice from a moral point of view. We're not clear 
what the implications of this act are in terms of respect for persons, 
equity or human welfare in these situations. As a result, we can't 
define clear obligations or rights or wrongs though the situation isn't 
morally neutral (Kohlberg, 197lb, pp. 20-2 1; emphasis added by 
Kalam). 
Kohlberg acknowledged here that his stages, especially Stage 6 
with its principle of justice-are at a loss because «nothing has been 
specified.» «We haven't been given what we need to determine right­
ness.» Kalam asked: «By whom?»-and goes on to note that Kohlberg 
is looking for direction from someone else, because his Stage 6 princi­
ple cannot solve the dilemma. In doing this, Kohlberg is looking outsi­
de of the autonomous self for direction-a classic lower stage of 
morality. After all, Stage 6 principles are supposed to be able to handle 
all major moral conflicts. 
Elsewhere, as Kalam noted (1981, pp. 199-204), Kohlberg is not so 
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reluctant to provide what needs to be «specified» to determine what is 
right and wrong. For example, consider how he set up the «Captain's 
Dilemma»: 
A charter plane crashed in the South Pacific. Three persons survived, 
the pilot and two passengers. One of the passengers was an old man 
who had a broken shoulder. Theother was a young man, strong and 
healthy. There was sorne chance that the raft could make it to the 
safety of the nearest island if two men rowed continuously for three 
weeks. However, there was almost no chance if all three of the men 
stayed on the raft. First of all, the food supply was meager. There 
was barely enough to keep two men alive for the three week period. 
Second, a storm was approaching and the raft would almost certainly 
capsize unless one man went overboard. This man could not cling to 
the raft and in all likelihood, would crown. A decision had to be 
made fast. The captain was strong and the only one who could 
navigate. If he went over there was almost no chance the other two 
would make it to safety. If the old man with the broken shoulder 
went, there was a very good probability, about 80%, that the other 
two could make it. If the young man went overboard and the old 
man and the captain stayed chances were a little less than 5 0/50.  No 
one would volunteer to go overboard. 
What should the captain do? Should he: 
a) order the old man overboard? 
b) should they draw staws? (Note: the captain has the 
option of including himself in the draw or not) 
c) let all three of them stay? 
(Kohlberg, 1978b, pp. 157-158) 
Kohlberg's Stage 6 answer to this problem is to draw lots where 
everyone has a 50% chance of survival. He is opposed to any one 
volunteering to sacrifice his life for the others since the volunteer is 
not getting true justice in this case. He is also opposed to all three 
deciding to stick together and luck it out. 
Kalam rightly noted that Kohlberg's solution here is based on a 
morality of quantity. That is, that two lives lived for a number of years 
is better than three lives lived (in a spirit of mutual encouragement, 
self-sacrifice and love) for an uncertain, presumably short, period. Here 
Kohlberg-in terms of his own theory-was using a quantative measu­
re of human life, and was therefore operating at Stage 1 or 2, where 
physical qualities determine the value of human life (Kalam, p. 20 1). 
More to our present concem which is Kohlberg's general neglect of 
sexual dilemmas, in the «Captain's Dilemma» Kohlberg was quite willing 
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to specify what was «needed» in order to come to a solution, while in 
the «Sexual Dilemma» he was not, for reasons that are not clear. 
1.14. The narrative critique 
In recent years, psychologists have made an impressive argument 
that there are two fundamentally different types of human cognition. 
One type is abstract, rationalistic, scientific, and propositional; the 
other is desc1ibed as concrete, emotional, imagistic, and narrative in 
character. Major theorists who make this claim include the cognitive 
psychologist Bruner (1986) who described one as «propositional,» and 
the other as «narrative» thought. Others who provide a similar analysis 
are Pavio (1978), Spence (1982), Tulving (1983), and Sarbin (1986). (For 
a summary discussion of this issue with special reference to moral 
development, see Vitz, 1990.) Now, Kohlberg's model of moral develo­
pment is exclusively based on an understanding of cognition as consis­
ting of only the abstract and propositional type. The idea that the 
moral life develops through the hearing and reading of stories, through 
the moral imagination, through the concrete narrative or story aspects 
of a moral conflict or dilemma is completely absent from Kohlberg's 
model. Sorne of this failure has already been noted in the critique of 
Kohlberg as overlooking empathy (e.g., Hoffman) and in the feminist 
critique of Gilligan who pointed out how women often tried to supply 
concrete details to make the moral dilemma more specific. 
1.1 5. The virtues critique 
The traditional approach to moral development,based on the vir­
tues, was explicitly disparaged by Kohlberg as irrelevent, useless and 
empirically unsupported. 
One of the major pieces of research used to reject the older appro­
ach is that of Hartshorne and May 1928; Hartshorne, May, & Maller, 
1929; Hart:shorne, May, & Shuttleworth 1930. These volumes describing 
the results of an extensive series of studies done in the 1920's became 
well known and were often cited as presenting evidence against the 
teaching of virtues by any method. This interpretation of the Hart­
shorne and May research was, however, seriously flawed. First, those 
who rejected Hartshorne, et al. failed to acknowledge the many fin­
dings that did support the teaching of virtues and character develop­
ment. For example, cert:ain high morale schools and teachers did 
produce students who behaved better (Hartshorne & May, 1928, pp. 
323, 338), and teacher ratings of trustworthiness did correlate with 
behavioral measures of honesty (e.g., Hart:shorne & May, 1928, p. 410). 
It is true t:hat Hartshorne and May concluded that their result:s did 
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not support the position that such traits as honesty, for example, are 
consistent across all settings. That is, moral behavior was at times 
found to be specific to the particular setting or kind of temptation. 
Such a finding would not surprise most virtue-oriented moralists, and 
it certainly would not surprise novelists or storytellers for whom cha­
racter is complex and context is always important. In any case, Hart­
shome and May's studies taken at face value are quite consistent with 
a general honesty factor as part of personality or character, but with 
specific and situational qualifications. 
Even more important, however, is the very strong case for the 
Hartshorne and May position made by the psychologist Rushton (1980, 
1984), who reanalyzed the Hartshorne and May data. He pointed out 
the high correlations, typically of the order of .50 and .60, between 
teacher ratings of children's honesty and the more reliable Hartshorne 
and May measures based on combining behavioral tests (Rushton, 
1984, p. 273). Rushton thus showed that Hartshorne's results have been 
consistently misunderstood in the psychological literature, especially 
by Kohlberg (e.g., 1984, pp. 498-509). Rushton (1984, p. 273) concluded 
that 
not only <lid total seores within the battery of altruism tests and 
measures yield evidence of consistency, but so too <lid measures of 
self-control, persistence, honesty, and moral knowledge. Indeed there 
was evidence for a pervasive general factor of moral character (e.g. , 
Hartshorne et al., 1930, p. 230, Table 32). 
On the basis of this and much other evidence such as the studies of 
Dlugokinski and Firestone (1974), Rushton (1980), and Rushton and 
Wheelwright (1980), he concluded that there is a trait of altruism in 
which sorne people are consistently more empathic, generous, helping, 
kind, and that this trait is readily perceived by others. Rushton (1984) 
also concluded that the consistently altruistic person is likely to have 
an integrated personality, strong feelings of personal efficacy and well­
being, and what generally might be called integrity (1984, p. 279). 
From this kind of work, it is clear that the notion of moral traits or 
virtues is alive and well within contemporary psychology. Other recent 
major contributions to this tradition by psychologists and educators 
include: Isaacs (1984), Coles (1986), Oliner and Oliner (1988), Lickona 
(1991), Kilpatrick (1992) and Bennett (1993). 
Theoretical support for the traditional concept of the virtues has 
also received very extensive treatment in the writings of important 
philosophers in the last two decades (Pieper, 1966; Murdoch, 1970; 
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Geach, 1977; Foot, 1978; Wallace, 1978; Perelman, 1979; Dykstra, 1981; 
Hauerwas, 1981; Maclntyre, 1981, 1986; Meilaender, 1984). 
Finally, in what is probably the only extensive longitudinal study of 
moral character, Peck (1960) reported substantial evidence for different 
reliably measured moral traits that are stable over time and consistent­
ly related to good character. This important study in most respects 
supported a character and social context approach to moral develop­
ment. 
1.16. Recent philosophical critiques 
The philosopher Owen Flanagan (1991) has developed an extended 
critique of Kohlberg-one often using psychological evidence as well. 
Flanagan's basic thesis is that moral thought is heterogeneous and 
cannot be characterized by any one principie or type of person. He 
interprets the entire emphasis on abstract, rationalistic justice as a 
seriously flawed understanding of the great variety of qualitatively di­
fferent types of moral thought. For example, he operates on the as­
sumption «( 1 )  That «justice is not the only virtue of individuals or 
societies; (2) That it is not the most important or most necessary requi­
rement in all forms or aspects of ethical life; and (3) That it is not 
required or even desirable as a motive in certain domains of life» (p. 
112). 
Flanagan's treatment provides a detailed philosophical critique of 
both the underlying assumptions and the stages of moral development 
proposed by both Piaget and Kohlberg. Sorne of Flanagan's criticisms 
had been made by others and have been summarized previously in 
these pages. Others are not familiar and the reader should see Flanagan's 
book in detail. The essential argument woven throughout is that: 
... the heterogeneity of the moral life is a deep and significant 
fact... it seems simply unbelievable that there could be a single ideal 
moral competence and a universal and irreversible sequence of stages 
according to which moral personality unfolds and against which 
moral maturity can be unequivocally plotted. (p. 195)  
Many conceptual inconsistencies have been noted in Kohlberg's 
published writings. For example, Schweder (1982a) reported numerous 
occasions when Kohlberg made a statement in one essay and contra­
dicted it later, often in the same essay. For example, in one essay he 
wrote that «a culture cannot be located at a single stage»; in a later 
essay, Kohlberg wrote that cultures are «highly stage-consistent across 
legal, religious and ethical systems.» Kohlberg wrote that Stage 6 ethics 
cannot identify what is iight or wrong. Somewhat later Kohlberg con-
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tradicted himself saying that Stage 6 reasoning leads to «morally right 
conclusions about specific dilemmas,» far example, opposition to capi­
tal punishment. 
Reed (1987), a majar critic of the confused nature of Kohlberg's 
philosophical and metaethical assumptions, has pointed out that R.M. 
Hare, J ohn Rawls, and William Frankena are assumed by Kohlberg to 
share his metaethical position. However, as Reed showed, these au­
thors do not agree among themselves, or with Kohlberg, on the matter 
of the definition of morality or how to secure it. 
Reed identified many philosophical inadequacies in Kohlberg. Far 
example, he noted that Stage 5-moral judgment-is not shown by 
Kohlberg to be superior to Stage 4-reasoning. That is, Stage 5 reaso­
ning is not shown to handle dilemmas and moral ambiguities that 
Stage 4 failed to <leal with. Thus, there is no obvious cognitive disso­
nance at Stage 4 that is shown to be resolved by Stage 5. Reed com­
mented that Kohlberg's failure here is «devastating to his position.» 
(1987' p. 44 7) 
2. Conclusion 
What is perhaps most striking about Kohlberg's model is that, 
despite many years of popularity, especially in education, it suffers 
from a remarkable number of grave weaknesses, many of which cons­
titute, by themselves, grounds far rejecting it. In spite of Kohlberg's 
rebuttal of his critics (e.g., Kohlberg, Levine and Hewer, 1984a,b), the 
system has not recovered from the multiplicity and gravity of the criti­
ques, and at present there is no convincing reason to accept Kohlberg's 
system. 
Attempts to revive the Kohlberg model have taken two directions. 
One approach, that of John Gibbs (199la,b), has been to combine 
Hoffman's empathy model with Kohlberg's cognitive stages. (Far a 
discussion of difficulties with this approach, see Gibbs, l99lc; Hoffman 
l99lb.) Another strategy has been to drop many of the criticized as­
pects of Kohlberg's model but keep the «valid» core; this has been the 
recent contribution of Puka (1991). But see Brown and Tappan (1991) 
far a sharp rejection of Puka. Probably the best single summary of the 
present complex situation can be faund in the three volumes of Kurti­
nes and Gewirtz (1991). 
In any event, since Kohlberg's death in 1987, the weaknesses in his 
model have become increasingly clear and, in spite of salvage attempts, 
. it appears to be receding as a facus of research and theoretical interest 
in the United States. 
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NOTE 
[ 1 ]  Very briefly, Kohlberg's stages are: Preconventional stages-Stage 1 :  punishment and 
obedience orientation; Stage 2: instrumental relativist orientation. Conventional stages­
Stage 3: interpersonal concordance or «good boy-nice girl» ; Stage 4: «law and order» 
orientation. Postconventional stages-Stage 5: social contracUlegalistic orientation; Stage 
6: universal ethical principle of justice. 
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SUMARIO: EXPOSICIÓN DE LAS CRÍTICAS AL MODELO DE KOHLBERG DE DESA­
RROLLO MORAL. 
Este artículo hace una exposición de las críticas más relevantes que ha recibido el 
conocido modelo de desarrollo moral de Kohlberg. Concretamente, las críticas que se 
presentan son las siguientes: la crítica del sí mismo completamente bueno, la crítica 
feminista, la crítica del relativismo moral, la crítica de la carencia de responsabilidad, la 
crítica del ateísmo del autor, la crítica de la empatía y la emoción, la crítica empírica sobre 
los estadios, la crítica de la excesiva dependencia de Kohlberg respecto al lenguaje, la 
crítica normativa, la crítica sobre metodología de los estudios, la crítica acerca de la 
relación entre estructura y contenido, la crítica ideológica, la crítica sobre su tratamiento 
de la moral sexual, la crítica narrativa y la crítica acerca de las virtudes. Estas críticas son 
expuestas y valoradas en el desarrollo del artículo. Los autores principales con los que se 
dialoga, aparte de Kohlberg y Piaget, son: Gilligan, Hoffman, Rushton y Schweder. 
También son tenidos especialmente en cuenta Bruner, Flanagan, Hartshorne, Kalam, 
Kurtines y Gewirtz, Maclntyre, Rawls, Rest, Vitz y Wolterstorff. 
KEY WORDS: Moral Education, Kohlberg, Theories of Moral Development. 
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